肇始于美国次贷危机的全球金融危机已逾十年，美联储历次宣布实施和退出量化宽松货币政策的举措，都为世界经济带来了较大震动。而今，面对美联储起伏不定的加息节奏和缩表步骤，全球各经济体都在积极应对其带来的影响。本文总结了美联储十年来执行非常规货币政策的三个阶段，并对我国政府各类预案措施和相关机制建设进行展望。

由美国次贷问题引发的全球金融危机是一次系统性金融危机，不仅国际金融市场遭遇重创，而且全球经济陷入了“大萧条”以来最为严重的衰退。为了应对这个系统性金融风险，很多经济体出台了史无前例的政策措施以挽救崩溃的金融体系和失衡的经济体系，全球主要发达经济体货币政策纷纷走向宽松的政策框架，基准利率不断下调至零利率。 量化宽松货币政策实质上是相关货币政策当局在面对传统政策难题尤其是名义利率“零约束”以及金融市场结构性问题日益凸显的情况下，开动“印钞机”以总量扩张的方式向市场输入流动性，同时还以各种资产规模计划变相为财政融资或为企业部门提供信用保障。在市场信心缺失、投资萎缩的情况下，量化宽松货币政策向市场释放的巨量流动性，以缓释市场紧张导致的估值体系崩溃和防止“明斯基时刻”引致的信用骤停，进而扭转投资信心，最后实质改善经济状况和就业状况。过去十年，美国货币政策以量化宽松为主导，经历了危机救援、经济复苏和政策整固三个阶段，基本形成了一个金融货币政策的完整周期。

2月2日，中国机构编制网发布《中国人民银行职能配置、内设机构和人员编制规定》。研究基地梳理发现，《规定》明确将国务院金融稳定发展委员会（即“金融委”）办公室设置在央行；央行增加宏观审慎职能；央行领导班子配置也发生变化，由原来的“一正六副”变为“一正四副”；在原有职责基础上，增加了部分监管职责；在机构设置方面，发生了相应的增减。

自1978年迄今，我国经济逢“八”则变、遇“九”皆难。过去的2018年见证了巨变。对于刚刚到来的2019年，上下各方都意识到凛冬已至。今年之困难，从全球看是过往以发达经济体为中心、以新兴和发展中经济体为外围的“中心-外围”模式彻底势衰的结果，从国内看则是人口红利时期政府主导模式难以为继的必然。

28日，标普获准正式进入中国开展信用评级业务，这标志着我国信用评级业的对外开放进一步提速，有助于完善我国信用评级体系。

在2018年年底召开的中央经济工作会议上，决策层坦承我国经济稳中有变、变中有忧，面临下行压力。国家统计局2019年1月21日发布数据显示，我国2018年GDP增长率为6.6%，创28年以来的新低。

中国人民银行创设央行票据互换工具(CBS)，为银行发行永续债补充资本提供流动性支持，在经济面临下行压力环境下对稳金融、稳投资、稳预期，防范化解重大风险，有序推进经济稳步增长具有重要意义。由于央行票据互换操作不涉及基础货币吞吐，对银行等金融体系的流动性影响趋于中性，不会对股市、债市和楼市等产生重大影响，直接有助于稳金融和稳预期。

　2019年，“稳增长”成为当前经济工作的首要任务之一，其着力点在于加大基建投资力度。在去杠杆、防风险背景下，城投、私募、信托等地方融资渠道逐渐收紧，“开前门”成为弥补基建资金缺口的不二法门。即提高地方政府债发行限额、加快地方政府债发行节奏，既是满足地方政府基本融资需求的主要方式，也是发挥政府债券资金作用于稳投资、扩内需、补短板的重要手段。 　　当然，要认识到地方政府债今年虽加快发行与扩容，但并不意味着防范化解地方债务风险将有所放松。地方政府举债融资规范化、债务信息“阳光化”仍是大势所趋，且地方债务风险防范管理依然将坚持“开前门、堵后门”的主思路。此外，借助交易所平台与商业银行柜台市场拓展地方债发行渠道，促使地方债投资主体更加多元化、交易更加活跃化，亦是地方债市场发展与建设的重要方面。

如果没有新的技术突破，随着移动支付进入平稳规范化发展，移动支付对货币政策传导的影响将逐渐趋于平稳。2013年以来，我国的移动支付交易规模迎来了爆发式的增长。 部分研究认为电子货币游离于银行体系之外，会削弱利率传导的效果，但这不符合我国移动支付发展的实情。尽管我国的移动支付多数是第三方支付，但与移动支付相关的电子货币依然在银行体系内，只是改变了流通中货币存在的形态，减少了货币从存款到现金再转化为存款的过程，降低了货币的贮藏成本和交易成本，但没有改变其信用货币的本质。 但是移动支付具有流动性强、交易成本低和交易便捷等优点，对传统货币产生替代效应及加速转化效应，不能忽视其对货币政策传导机制以及货币政策传导效果的影响。

Preface: Structural Slowdown to China's Economic Growth  Li Yang 1 International Economic Background of China's Economic Slowdown  Since the global financial crisis in 2008, the world economy has exhibited the following symptoms of long-term stagnation. First, after having been plagued by the crisis for over eight years, the world economy is still deeply trapped in the quagmire of weak recovery, low growth, high unemployment, low inflation, high debt and high risks. Major problems that led to the eruption of crisis-serious distortions in the development patterns and economic, fiscal and financial structures of major countries-still persist. Moreover, nonconventional measures introduced by countries in the aftermath of the crisis have displayed increasingly negative side effects-the most significant of which include flagging return on investment, high debt and leverage ratios, excessive money supply, panic over the central bank's plan to shrink balance sheet, fiscal cliff, loose market discipline and growing social turbulence. Second, major countries are not in sync with each other in their economic operations, as evidenced in uncertain price changes of bulk commodities, interest rate gaps, wild exchange rate volatility and rampant international hot money. Long-term and disorderly change in the macroeconomic variables of countries has created a hotbed for “carry trade”. Mass cross-border flow of international hot money that disrupted international financial markets has been a new normal of the world economy. Third, major countries face the dilemma between “deleveraging” and “balance sheet repair” in selecting macroeconomic policies. The recent round of financial crisis was induced by the high debt-to-GDP and leverage ratios of major economies. In this sense, recovery from crisis is apparently contingent upon the necessary condition of “deleveraging”. Yet deleveraging has to overcome at least two hurdles. First, savings rate and deposits must be substantially increased to accomplish deleveraging-both of which are hard to achieve for most countries. Second, as a precondition for economic recovery, deleveraging will trigger “balance sheet repair” shocks, forcing enterprises to shift their priority from “maximizing profits” to “minimizing debts”. This will give rise to the “fallacy of composition”, where society as a whole is preoccupied with debt repayment, putting production and investment on the sidelines. As a result, the economy as a whole will be struck by credit crunch. The fourth symptom is trade protectionism, geopolitical tension and frequent regional conflicts. Against the backdrop of a slowing economy, rising unemployment and lurking risks, governments naturally resorted to trade protectionism in the name of protecting national industries and employment, as evidenced by Brexit and the Trump administration's protectionist stance. With all these headwinds, the growth of world trade has stayed below world GDP growth for four years in a row, triggering the process of “de-globalization”. Fifth, vacuum in global governance has appeared. Since World War II, dedicated governance institutions have been created in almost all sectors of the international community supported by specialized governance rules, best practices and norms. These institutions and rules have formed complete governance mechanisms in all sectors, and have been functioning effectively until the eruption of the recent financial crisis. Since 2007, the current global governance mechanism has failed to cope with traditional challenges and increasingly complex nonconventional challenges. It is fair to say that the international governance system dominated by advanced economies since World War II has been shaken to its foundation. The above challenges will persist in the long run as major economies fall into long-term stagnation in the long cycle of global economic downturn. From supply side, the culprits of long-term stagnation include slow technology progress, worsening demographic structure, falling productivity and negative real interest rates. From demand side, “output gaps” continue to persist ,i.e. real growth rate is below its long-term potential for a protracted period of time. From the perspective of macroeconomic policy, monetary policy has failed under the negative equilibrium interest rate (liquidity trap). Moreover, increasingly uneven income distribution has further ruptured society and inhibited socio-economic dynamism and growth potentials. 2 China's Economy in the New Normal While the world economy struggles with long-term stagnation, China's economy has entered into the new normal characterized by structural deceleration. Nevertheless, the slowdown of economic growth from rapid to medium-rapid growth is accompanied by an upgrade in the overall quality, efficiency, environmental performance and sustainability of China's economy. In other words, China's new normal is blessed with the positive elements of economic upgrade, refinement and restructuring in an advanced stage of development. These changes are both the extrinsic features and intrinsic causes of the new normal. First, China's economy is experiencing structural deceleration. Save for the anomaly in 2010 caused by the fiscal stimulus policy in 2009, the slow deceleration of China's economic growth started from 2008 and the downward pressures remain unabated today. Our forecast of potential growth rates lends credence to the tendency of China's structural deceleration. As revealed by the forecast of the Macroeconomic Operation and Policy Simulation Laboratory of CASS, the range of China's potential growth rates for the three periods of 2011-2015,2016-2020and 2021-2030 is 7.8%-8.7%, 5.7%-6.6%and 5.4% and 6.3% respectively, indicating a rather significant tendency of deceleration. The reasons for China's economic structural deceleration derive from change in factor supply efficiency. Population, capital and technology are the key drivers of economic growth. Over the past three decades, China's rapid growth has been supported by the tremendous flow of tens of millions of unemployed or semi-employed people into the manufacturing sector. However, due to falling labor participation rate and population growth since 2012, China's demographic dividend is diminishing and being replaced by demographic debt with the arrival of the Lewis turning point. In 2015, the growth rate of China's labor input fell to -0.9% for the first time in 30 years, which revealed a bleak prospect. Over the past three decades, China's capital formation rate has maintained a fairly high level under the support of high savings rate. However, diminishing demographic dividend, flagging momentum of industrialization, slowing growth of savings rate, falling return on capital and decreasing capital output ratio have caused capital input to lose steam in the absence of inflation, with the growth rate of fixed asset investment down from an average of 26% in the past three decades to 8.1% in 2016.Technology progress remains disappointing, posing long-term challenges of low return on capital and a dearth of breakthrough. According to statistics, China's labor productivity fell to 8.16%during 2008-2015 with TFP contribution to GDP down from the previous two-digit to 8.56%. Meanwhile, the output elasticity of capital is falling as well. In a nutshell, the overlapping effect of diminishing labor and capital input growth rates and slow technology progress have caused China's falling economic growth rate at the factor side of economic growth.ost o Second, changing resource allocation efficiency. China's economic growth over the past three decades has been primarily fueled by the transfer of tremendous resources from agricultural sector to industrial sector and from inefficient primary industries to the more efficient manufacturing sector. Over the years, resource reallocation on a massive scale has brought about tremendous improvement in labor productivity. However, as China's manufacturing sector as a share in GDP became saturated and plagued by overcapacity, resources including population began to shift to tertiary industry dominated by the service sector. In 2016, the service sector already accounted for 51.6% in China's GDP, which exceeded the share of manufacturing by 11.8 percentage points. However, as is commonly the case with other countries, labor productivity of the service sector is significantly below that of the manufacturing sector. Such productivity gaps are particularly striking in China, where the service sector is normally at the bottom of the productivity scale. According to analysis by the Institute of Economics, CASS, labor productivity of China's tertiary industry was only 70% that of secondary industry during 2006-2015.Given such gaps, China's overall labor productivity will inevitably fall as more and more of the population and other economic resources move from manufacturing to the less productive service sector, thus taking a toll on growth. Third, innovation is lacking. Over the past three decades, China's innovation agenda has been dominated by learning from other countries as productivity could be easily and continuously increased by transferring surplus labor from agriculture to the export-oriented manufacturing sector that relies on imported technology. However, when China is towards the end of completing its curriculum to catch up with other countries, there is not much to learn from overseas, or put another way, advanced countries have put up technology barriers against a rising China. In any case, the “learning by doing” model proves to be unsustainable and China must shift from dependence on technology import to indigenous innovation-a transition by no means easy to accomplish. For instance, although China ranked first in the world in 2014 in terms of the number of patent applications and was among the leading nations in terms of the publication of academic papers, China's conversion rate of patents remains in the middle globally. As recently pointed out by President Xi Jinping, “innovation cannot be accomplished as soon as papers are published and patents are obtained；innovation must be embedded in the creation of new growth drivers and be turned into practical industrial activities”. President Xi's remarks have clearly identified the crux of China's lack of innovation. Fourth, natural resources and environmental capacity are increasingly constrained. Wasteful use of resources characterized China's extensive pattern of economic growth. Since the dawn of the century, the surging prices of energy and other bulk commodities followed by wild price volatility put a brake on China's resource-intensive growth pattern. While the environment did not receive high priority in the past, persistent smoggy weathers, serious heavy-metal exceedance in food and extensive pollution of drinking water have unfolded rampant environmental problems in China-problems that took over a century to appear in developed countries but became evident in China, a country still in its development stage. While we start to address the scourge of environmental pollution, the negative factor of natural resources and environmental constraints will be endogenously added to China's economic growth function.) In the new normal, the basic characteristics of China's economic development are that much of its real economy has yet to find a new direction of development and that return on investment keeps falling. As a result, the financing function of the financial system is losing support and purpose. In this context, the accumulation and revelation of financial risks become inevitable.